



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO EDUCATING FUTURE IW
PLANNERS**

by

Scott E. Sill

September 2009

Thesis Advisor:	Peter J. Gustaitis II
Second Reader:	Brian H. Greenshields

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE September 2009	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: An Analytical Approach to Educating Future IW Planners		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR Scott E. Sill			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT This thesis examines USSOCOM's proposal to educate IW strategists / campaign planners, and compares it to the existing model utilized by SAMS for educating conventional campaign planners. SAMS is a good comparative model because the SAMS program has a proven record in conventional campaign planning. Simply put, SAMS is a success and a model for other advanced ILE programs. This comparative analysis extracts educational "best practices" from both approaches and makes recommendations for consideration. Even with an optimal approach, implementation is an equally challenging problem. At the end, the thesis identifies future research opportunities for the utilization of USSOCOM's IW educated officers.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS IW Execution Roadmap, QDR, SAMS, USSOCOM, irregular warfare, SOMDP, professional military education			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 82
			16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO EDUCATING FUTURE IW PLANNERS

Scott E. Sill
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army
B.A., The Citadel, 1990

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2009**

Author: Scott E. Sill

Approved by: Peter J. Gustaitis, II
Thesis Advisor

Colonel Brian H. Greenshields (USAF)
Second Reader

Dr. Gordon McCormick
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines USSOCOM's proposal to educate IW strategists / campaign planners, and compares it to the existing model utilized by SAMS for educating conventional campaign planners. SAMS is a good comparative model because the SAMS program has a proven record in conventional campaign planning. Simply put, SAMS is a success and a model for other advanced ILE programs. This comparative analysis extracts educational "best practices" from both approaches and makes recommendations for consideration. Even with an optimal approach, implementation is an equally challenging problem. At the end, the thesis identifies future research opportunities for the utilization of USSOCOM's IW educated officers.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
A.	BACKGROUND	1
B.	THESIS PROBLEM STATEMENT	2
C.	METHODOLOGY	3
D.	CHAPTER ORGANIZATION	3
II.	THE QDR, IW EXECUTION ROADMAP AND THE SERVICES' PLANS ...	7
A.	HISTORY OF THE QDR	7
B.	CREATION OF THE IW ROADMAP	10
C.	THE SERVICES PLAN TO MAKE IW STRATEGISTS AS COMPETENT AS CONVENTIONAL STRATEGISTS	12
III.	THE USSOCOM APPROACH TO IW EDUCATION	19
A.	WHY TASK A UNIFIED COMMAND TO PROVIDE IW EDUCATION?	19
B.	USSOCOM'S PLAN TO EDUCATE IW STRATEGISTS (TASK 2.6.8)	21
C.	USSOCOM'S THREE TIERED PROGRAM FOR TASK 2.6.9(U) ..	23
D.	THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS MASTERS DEGREE PROGRAM AT NPS	27
E.	"CENTERS OF GRAVITY" FOR IW EDUCATION	29
F.	SEARCHING FOR A SUCCESSFUL MODEL FOR CAMPAIGN PLANNING	31
IV.	CASE STUDY: SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES	33
A.	HISTORY OF SAMS	33
B.	EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT	35
1.	Student Selection	35
2.	Faculty	36
C.	TEACHING METHODOLOGY	37
D.	CURRICULUM	38
V.	COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF USSOCOM'S IW EDUCATION PROPOSAL TO SAMS CONVENTIONAL PLANNER EDUCATION	41
A.	COMPARISON OF EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT	41
1.	Student Selection	41
2.	Faculty	44
B.	COMPARISON OF TEACHING METHODS	45
1.	USSOCOM	45
2.	SAMS	46
3.	Commonalities	47
C.	COMPARISON OF CURRICULUM	48
VI.	FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	55
A.	FINDINGS	55

B.	CONCLUSIONS: THREE AREAS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF USSOCOM'S APPROACH	56
1.	Curriculum	56
2.	Computer Simulations and Exercises	57
3.	Educational Oversight	58
C.	RECOMMENDATIONS	58
VII.	THE WAY-AHEAD	61
	LIST OF REFERENCES	63
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	67

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	QDR to IW Roadmap Process.....	9
Figure 2.	SOF IW Strategist/Campaign Planner Education Concept.....	24

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMSP	Advanced Military Studies Program
AOASF	Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship
BPC	Building Partner Capacity
CAP	Crisis Action Planning
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CGSOC	Command and General Staff Officer Course
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
COIN	Counterinsurgency (COIN),
CT	Counterterrorism (CT)
DIMEFILE	Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Finances, Intelligence and Law Enforcement
DoD	Department of Defense
GCC	Global Combatant Commands
GPF	General Purpose Forces
ILE/AOWC	Intermediate Level Education/Advanced Officer Warfighter Course
IO	Information Operations
ITC	Instructor Training Course
IW	Irregular Warfare
JAWS	Joint Advanced Warfighting School
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff

JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)
JSOU	Joint Special Operations University
JSOWC	Joint Special Operations Warfighter Certificate
NDU	National Defense University
NOPC	Naval Operator's Planner Course
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
NSC	National Security Council
PAJE	Process for Accreditation of Joint Education
PME	Professional Military Education
POI	Programs of Instruction
PSYOP	Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
SAASS	School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
SAMS	School of Advanced Studies
SAW	School of Advanced Warfighting
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SOFK	Special Operations Knowledge and Futures
SOMDP	Special Operations Master's Degree Program
TRADOC	United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
WASC	Western Association of Schools and Colleges
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare (UW)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper would not have been possible without the tireless efforts of three individuals. First, thanks to my wife, Colleen, who pushed me to continue the process. Second, thank you Col(R) Gustaitis, whom even in retirement from the Naval Postgraduate School never compromised your exacting standards, or gave up on this thesis. I have learned much more than how to write a thesis from you. Lastly, Col Greenshields, thank you for making countless introductions and corrections that resulted in some of the most insightful discoveries contained in this thesis.

-Scott

E. Sill

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recognized the Department of Defense's (DoD) ability to plan, fight and win conventional conflicts, noting that the "U.S. Military was without equal in the planning and execution of conventional warfare." It is the argument in this thesis that this accomplishment would not have been possible without the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) program. However, the QDR also pointed out the need for equally qualified irregular warfare (IW) planners, to plan, coordinate, synchronize, and execute IW campaigns. In response to the QDR, the Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap specifically addressed the need to improve DoD's ability to conduct irregular warfare.¹ Consequently, the IW Execution Roadmap established specific educational requirements for each military service and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).² The IW Roadmap established a timeline for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to develop a strategy to identify and educate Irregular Warfare Specialists (IW planners).

The Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense has primary responsibility for all the Execution Roadmaps, with each roadmap having a co-lead from the Joint Staff and

¹ The Joint Staff created eight execution roadmaps, including IW.

² SOCOM was the only Combatant Command tasked for two reasons. First, SOCOM has "Service-like" responsibilities; second, the QDR Execution Roadmap recognized Special Operations unique IW requirements.

Office of Secretary of Defense.³ This thesis focuses only on the IW Roadmap. The IW Roadmap Executive Committee (EXCOM) co-chairs are Mr. Ryan Henry Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSD) and Lieutenant General (LTG) Doug Lute Director of Operations, J-3 the Joint Staff. The IW Roadmap tasks were not just for the Services; USSOCOM was tasked as well. According to the IW Execution Roadmap, DoD is required to institute thirty-one separate tasks, or initiatives. This thesis addresses only the two major education tasks and USSOCOM's unclassified education requirements in order to ensure the thesis widest potential distribution. In response to this tasking, the CJCS released a Deputy Secretary of Defense approved "action memo" on March 20, 2007.⁴ This action memorandum detailed the "way ahead" by which the individual Services and USSOCOM would create an education process to provide a very diverse set of tools to fight and win an irregular warfare campaign or conflict.

B. THESIS PROBLEM STATEMENT

This thesis examines USSOCOM's proposal to educate IW planners. It then asks can USSOCOM's current educational initiatives successfully create IW planners, in accordance with the QDR directives. The thesis compares USSOCOM's response to the existing SAMS model. The SAMS model is a good comparative model due to its proven record in

³ Christine Osowski, "Approaching the QDR as a Process," *The Avascent Review* 10 (2006), 2.

⁴ Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff action memo, *IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8 Plan*, (U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 16 February 2008).

conventional campaign planning.⁵ Simply put, it is the author's opinion that SAMS is a success at teaching conventional operational planning and a model for other programs. This comparative analysis extracts educational "best practices" from both approaches and makes recommendations for consideration. Even with an optimal approach, implementation is an equally challenging problem. At the end, the thesis identifies future research opportunities for the utilization of USSOCOM's IW educated officers.

C. METHODOLOGY

This thesis uses a comparative case study analysis to compare two systems in order to determine whether USSOCOM can successfully create IW planners, in accordance with QDR directives, based on their current educational initiatives. This thesis reviews how the SAMS program came into existence, evolved, how SAMS students are educated, and why that education has proven to be one of DoD's best institutions for the development of campaign planners. This comparative analysis identifies "key take aways" and "best practices" from both programs, with an eye toward integrating such practices into an alternative USSOCOM IW education program.

D. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION

Chapter I introduces the topic, defines the thesis problem and outlines the main topics for each chapter.

⁵ SAMS graduates have participated in contingency operations, including Operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, Uphold Democracy and, most recently, Iraqi Freedom.

Chapter II discusses the history of the QDR and creation of the IW Execution Roadmap. It traces the IW education process from the QDR through the Execution Roadmap. This chapter also briefly examines the Services plans to educate IW specialists.

Chapter III examines USSOCOM's plan for IW education. This chapter covers the three-tiered SOF Strategist/Campaign Planner Education Concept, developed by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU). This concept includes education from a variety of sources, including the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Special Operations Masters Degree Program (SOMDP).

Chapter IV examines the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) at the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) to determine the attributes and skills that make SAMS graduates so successful. This chapter reviews the development of the SAMS program, selection criteria for student attendance, faculty selection, teaching method and curriculum.

Chapter V is a comparative analysis of the SAMS program and USSOCOM's proposed IW education process. This chapter compares student selection, faculty, teaching methods and curriculum between the two programs. After analyzing the SAMS course in conventional campaign planning, are there lessons that USSOCOM can learn? If so, should USSOCOM import portions of this successful program into their own IW education concept? Is there a capabilities gap between conventional campaign planners and those educated in the SOMDP at NPS?

Chapter VI acts as a thesis summary, determining best practices from both the USSOCOM proposed plan and the

existing SAMS program. It provides recommendations from the SAMS program to improve USSOCOM's proposed IW education process. The chapter concludes with the author's model of a USSOCOM IW Strategist / Campaign Planner education program.

Chapter VII proposes several areas for further research. These areas include cost considerations for expanding SOMDP, a manpower survey to determine the number and placement of IW Strategist / Campaign Planners throughout DoD and the development of an additional skill identifier (ASI) designating SOMDP graduates as SOF IW Strategist / Campaign Planners. Other areas may include using the findings of this thesis as a springboard to expand IW education within the individual Services' PME programs.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. THE QDR, IW EXECUTION ROADMAP AND THE SERVICES' PLANS

A. HISTORY OF THE QDR

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union, it became apparent to Congress that the Cold War strategy of containment, with its force-sizing and force-shaping constructs, was fast becoming dangerously obsolete. With no single superpower to challenge the United States, DoD required a new method to determine the size and scope of the U.S. military. In 1997, Senator Dan Coats of Indiana and Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut sponsored legislation establishing the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct a review of military threats every four years and to present its findings to Congress. The intent is to keep the U.S. military fully aligned with emerging threats.

Secretary of Defense William Cohen produced the first QDR in 1997. This review introduced the idea of a "revolution in military affairs," an early version of "transformation."⁶ The three major points of the first QDR included the development

[of an]overarching *defense* strategy to deal with the world today and tomorrow, identify required military capabilities, and define the programs and policies needed to support them. Building on the President's National Security Strategy, we determined that U.S. defense strategy for the near and long term must continue to shape the strategic environment to advance U.S. interests,

⁶ Tom Donnelly, "Kill the QDR," *Armed Forces Journal*, February 2006, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/02/1813832>.

maintain the capability to respond to the full spectrum of threats, and prepare now for the threats and dangers of tomorrow and beyond.⁷

The new approach was "revolutionary" because for the first time since 1946 the U.S. military was creating a strategy to engage and defeat enemies other than Communist nations. The second QDR was released on September 30, 2001. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz said the QDR had been "largely completed" prior to the September 11th attacks and that the events of that day "confirm" the QDR's basic direction, particularly the move toward homeland defense and preparations for counterterrorism. Despite Wolfowitz's testimony, the events of 9/11 overshadowed this QDR and the military appeared lethargic in its ability to react decisively against the non-state perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. The requirement to pursue a transnational terrorist organization caused Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to scrap his transformation plans for a "light, fast, technology-driven" armed forces, that would be able to "assure, dissuade, deter, and defeat" any opponent. The U.S. military's stated goal in early 2001 was to "be strong enough to deter an opponent from aggression, and if deterrence fails, America's armed forces must be able to decisively defeat any opponent."⁸ This mission statement, predicated on expectations that the country's primary threats would come from "nation states," did not adequately address asymmetric threats such as religious fundamentalism,

⁷ William Cohen, The QDR of 1997, info accessed via internet (Jan 01, 2009), <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/msg.html>.

⁸ Donald Rumsfeld, The QDR of 2001, info accessed via internet (Jan 15, 2009), <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/qdr2001.pdf> III-IV.

failed or failing states, transnational crime, humanitarian disasters or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In fact, the strategic vision contained in the 2001 QDR appears very different from the reality of current conflict in the 21st century. Within four years, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld would describe the oncoming series of campaigns against militant Islamic radical groups as "the long, hard slog ahead."⁹ The 2006 QDR recognized the new threat environment and issued eight "Execution Roadmaps" to provide direction and guidance to the Department of Defense (DoD).¹⁰ (See Figure 1.)




Figure 1. QDR to IW Roadmap Process¹¹

⁹ Tom Donnelly, "Kill the QDR," *Armed Forces Journal*, February 2006, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/02/1813832>.

¹⁰ The 8 Executive Roadmaps include: Authorities, Tag, Track & Localize Threats, Building Partner Capacity, Strategic Communications, Joint Command & Control, DoD Institutional Reform and Governance, Sensor-based Management of the ISR Enterprise and Irregular Warfare.

¹¹ Greg Metzgar & Scott Sill, SOCJFCOM Irregular Warfare capabilities brief to Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb, CMG DSO OBE, Deputy Commanding General Multi-National Force-Iraq, 07 July 2008, slide 3.

B. CREATION OF THE IW ROADMAP

Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England signed the classified "IW Execution Roadmap" on April 28, 2006.¹² The IW Execution Roadmap is actually a collection of thirty-one actions, tasks and new milestones that articulates how DoD intends to improve its ability to conduct "long-duration operations, including unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), counterterrorism (CT), counterinsurgency (COIN) and stabilization and reconstruction operations." "The roadmap itself lays out a plan of action," said Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and one of the roadmap's principal authors.¹³

Unique to the several Roadmaps, including the IW Roadmap, DoD tasked both the individual Services and USSOCOM. DoD recognized SOCOM's singular comparative advantage at IW due to the fact most IW missions closely resemble several of USSOCOM's primary mission competencies, including UW, FID, CT and COIN. The IW Execution Roadmap's overall suspense was the next fiscal year (2007), and required the Services and USSOCOM to develop action plans for implementation of the Roadmap directives. Each identified IW task also required a separate "action memo" from the Joint Staff to detail how the separate services and USSOCOM would meet the requirements for each task.

¹² This thesis discusses the unclassified sections of the IW Roadmap, allowing for greater distribution and audience. It is the author's opinion that omitting the classified parts of the IW Roadmap does not detract from the analysis or findings.

¹³ Jason Sherman, "New Blueprint for Irregular Warfare," *Military.com*, May 16, 2006, <http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,97301,00.html> (accessed 24 October, 2007).

IW Roadmap section 2.6 (U) has nine subtasks for redesigning Joint and Service education and training. Within these nine subtasks, two tasks specifically address IW planner education. IW Task 2.6.8 states, "The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in coordination with the Chiefs of the Military Services, will provide to the Deputy Secretary of Defense by 30 June 2006 a plan to ensure that the DoD cadre of strategists and campaign planners are as competent at irregular warfare as conventional warfare." ¹⁴ Task 2.6.9 (unclassified portions) directs the CJCS, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and Service Chiefs to "provide to the Secretary of Defense by June 30, 2006 a plan, for establishing, selecting, training, educating and developing a cadre of irregular warfare strategists and campaign planners to serve in joint and Service billets at national level and on combatant command and component staffs."¹⁵

The IW Execution Roadmap also recognizes that there is no skill set identifier¹⁶ for IW planners. While conducting research for this thesis, the author discovered even though each Service has a conventional operational strategist planner program, there is no shared joint designator across the Services to identify officers who have completed one of the advanced studies programs. This is the case with all "conventional" focused Service campaign planner programs.

¹⁴ DoD, Office of the CJCS, Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8, 16 February 2007, 1.

¹⁵ Francisco H. Silebi, Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.9, 10 October 2007, 1.

¹⁶ U.S. Army tracks the various skills and training Soldiers accomplish by assigning the designation of that skill a two-digit alphanumeric code for various skills, education or training which the Army service member has annotated on his official record.

Each Service does, however, track their own graduates. The School of Advanced Studies (SAMS) at Ft. Leavenworth provides its graduates with the Army Career Field Functional Area 59 (Strategic Plans and Policy). Graduates from the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) at National Defense University receive accreditation by the JS to fill billets at the Combatant Command and JS level as joint campaign planners and strategists. The Navy Service recognizes United States Marine Corps (USMC) School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) and Naval Operator's Planning Course (NOPC) graduates as having the capabilities to design and manage warfare at the operational level. There is no Additional Qualification Designation (AQD) for SAW or NOPC programs within the Navy. Graduates of the Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) program are expert strategists on the art and science of aerospace warfare. Although there is no single tracking mechanism or skill set identifier approved by the JS for these programs, each program's reputation make their graduates highly sought after by GCCs and the JS.

SAMS graduates are known as the Army's "Jedi-Knights," because of the planning skills displayed during the first Gulf War. The goal of tasks 2.6.8 and 2.6.9 is to replicate this same capability in irregular warfare planning and strategy.

C. THE SERVICES PLAN TO MAKE IW STRATEGISTS AS COMPETENT AS CONVENTIONAL STRATEGISTS

In response to IW Roadmap task 2.6.8, the Joint Staff declared:

The center of gravity for producing strategist and campaign planners is at the joint and service advanced course as follows: [Joint Advanced Warfighting School] JAWS, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS); School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW); School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS); Naval Operator's Planner Course (NOPC); and the Naval Post Graduate School (NPS).¹⁷

It requires a plan to ensure officers and enlisted service members throughout DoD serving in joint and service billets at the national level, on combatant commands and component staffs receive IW education and training.¹⁸ The Joint Staff recommended that advanced intermediary Professional Military Education (PME) and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) become the "center of gravity" for this education.¹⁹ They specified several advanced professional military education (PME) studies and Master's degree curricula that would become the primary avenues schools for advanced IW education.

To address IW Roadmap Task 2.6.8, action officers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), J-7 Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Education & Doctrine Division, assessed each of the Services and SOCOM. They based their assessment on each Service providing a detailed description of the number of hours devoted to IW education within each of their PME programs. Upon which, the Director of the Joint Staff compiled each of the Services and SOCOM's individual plans for addressing the IW Execution Roadmap

¹⁷ *Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8*, 6, paragraph 6.3.

¹⁸ *Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8*, action memo, 16 February 2007, coversheet bullet two.

¹⁹ *IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8*, 3, paragraph 6.3.

Task 2.6.8 into one action memo. The CJCS recommended this action memorandum for educating strategists and campaign planners for approval to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 16 February 2007. They stated, "Joint and Service colleges and schools are making excellent progress on updating and improving the IW content in curriculums and are mainstreaming IW in Joint Professional Military Education and Professional Military Education using existing funding to meet the requirements." Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England approved the CJCS's action memorandum recommendation on March 3, 2007.

Coordination and integration of programs to develop IW strategists and campaign planners into the Services' PME systems are currently underway. USSOCOM, consisting of JSOU, the Special Operations Knowledge and Futures Center (SOK-F), Air Force Special Operations School (AFSOS) and SOMDP integrate and share IW initiatives with the National Defense University (NDU).²⁰

A short explanation of each Services plan follows. The Army will develop proficiency at IW campaign planning and COIN operations by implementing IW training into the United States Army War College (USAWC) three primary curriculums and FA 59 SAMS program.²¹ IW subjects will be included at all Command and General Staff College (CGSC) courses, Sergeants Major Academy, Battle Staff Non-Commissioned

²⁰ NDU is primarily responsible to conduct intermediate and senior level joint education.

²¹ USAWC curricula include the Joint Force Land Component Commander Course (JFLCC), United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI).

Officers (NCO) Course, Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), and Maneuver Combat Training Centers (MCTCs).²²

The Navy plan will develop and track with an Additional Qualification Designation (AQD) an elective track on insurgency / terrorism at the Naval War College (NWC). They will increase IW subjects at NOPC, and leverage NPS' Special Operations Masters Degree Program for additional IW expertise. The United States Naval Academy (USNA) has established programs to enhance linguistic and cultural education recommendations made in the 2006 QDR.²³

The Air Force plan builds additional cultural, expeditionary and combat skills into the Officer Accession Training (OTS) and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). IW subjects are included in the Air and Space Basic Course, Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College courses, including SAASS advanced studies course. The Air Force further leverages sister, joint and allied service schools; as well as includes IW instruction at the Air War College.²⁴

The Marine Corps plan leverages their current PME course of instruction to produce IW capable campaign planners. IW and COIN subjects are an integral part of the curriculum at the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) program, Command and Staff College (CSC), SAW, and Marine Corps University (MCU). The Marine Corps War College

²² *Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8, 6, annex A Army Plan, A-1-A-6.*

²³ *Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8, 6, annex B Navy Plan, B-1-B-2.*

²⁴ *Ibid, annex C Air Force Plan, C-1-C-2.*

(MCWAR) realigned their mission statement and curriculum to increase the importance of the study of IW.²⁵

The Services are required to develop IW strategists based on their own assessments to address their own internal Service requirements. The first requirement the Services assessed was to determine how much IW education needs incorporation into Service PME and JPME programs. The CJCS provides additional guidance, known as Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs), to Service and Joint PME programs. Colleges and schools evaluate the SAEs and incorporate the SAEs into their curricula; however, inclusion is not required, nor do the SAEs provide guidance on the number of hours a subject should have allotted.²⁶ This decentralized approach allows the individual Services to conduct their own mission analysis and develop an appropriate level of IW instruction to meet Service specific requirements. It is the author's opinion, based on research done for this thesis, that any educational assessment from the JS tasking the Services to determine their own requirements, followed by self-enforcement of these requirements by the Services, may not result in a very rigorous analysis or strenuous enforcement of the original JS tasking. The tasking is equivalent to allowing the fox to determine the requirements for guarding the hen house.

To answer IW Roadmap task 2.6.9 for how USSOCOM in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,

²⁵ *Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8*, 6, annex D Marine Corps Plan, D-1-D-3.

²⁶ *Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8*, action memo, 16 February 2007, 3, paragraph 5.6-6.1, derived from CJCSI 1800.01C, December 2005, Officer Professional Development Policy.

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, CJCS, and Services accomplish developing a cadre of IW strategists and planners, there are two parts, internal to USSOCOM and external Service programs. USSOCOM developed a plan to utilize their current educational structures to create IW strategists among Special Operations Forces (SOF) to fulfill USSOCOM's unique IW requirements. Chapter III details how USSOCOM leverages both the initiatives of the Services' advanced studies programs and its own JSOU, AFSOS and SOMDP to provide a detailed account of USSOCOM's response to the IW education tasks.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. THE USSOCOM APPROACH TO IW EDUCATION

A. WHY TASK A UNIFIED COMMAND TO PROVIDE IW EDUCATION?

While the Secretary of Defense, through the IW Execution Roadmap, required all Services to provide IW education, he also tasked USSOCOM to create a plan for IW education. Since its inception on November 14, 1986, USSOCOM has occupied a unique position in DoD. Unlike the geographical combatant commands (GCCs), who are responsible for certain geographical areas, USSOCOM serves instead as a unified command with worldwide responsibilities for special operations (SO) and serves as the global synchronizer within DoD for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). USSOCOM also has service-like responsibilities via Major Force Programs (MFP) 11 funding authorities. These MFP 11 authorities include controlling its own budgets, research/development staffs, training, education and force provider responsibilities that are more akin to Service authorities and responsibilities. After September 11, 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld asserted:

Responsibility for the Global War on Terror (GWOT) campaign plan is vested in SOCOM. Responsibility for theater GWOT strategy is the responsibility of the Geographical Combatant Commanders. . . . SOCOM has been designated as the supported command to plan, synchronize and when directed, execute GWOT strategies and operations.²⁷

²⁷ Michael Vickers, *Implementing GWOT Strategy: Overcoming Interagency Problems*, Testimony before the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 15 April 2006, <http://csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/T.20060315.ImplementingGWOT/T.20060315.ImplementingGWOT.pdf>, (accessed 25 November 2007).

This new requirement reinforces some of USSOCOM's oldest missions; the broader mission set of IW includes conducting Psychological Operations (PSYOP), COIN, UW and FID. After 9/11, the initial USSOCOM strategy was direct action. After almost eight years of constant combat DoD and USSOCOM have realized they must shift emphasis away from the high-profile raids that were the hallmark of the early years of U.S. counterterrorism (CT) efforts. The kill/capture requirement is necessary; however, this is often short sighted and counterproductive, angering locals while undermining domestic leaders. The indirect strategy, contained within USSOCOM's 2007 posture statement, consists of three lines of operation: enabling foreign partners, deterring support to terrorists and eroding extremist ideologies.²⁸ The ability to prepare SOF officers to engage in the indirect approach goes hand in hand with QDR task 2.6.9 (U), the creation of IW strategists and campaign planners.

The CJCS tasked USSOCOM to create IW strategists on par with conventional planners and create an education program of instruction to produce IW strategists/planners.²⁹ As explained earlier, USSOCOM's unique role in the GWOT required an equally unique response, separate from the Services. The USSOCOM J-9 staff created two working groups - one for each Roadmap educational task. In turn, each reported to the same "steering committee," chaired by the

²⁸ USSOCOM 2007 Posture Statement, 4, <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/posture2007.pdf>, (accessed 26 April, 2009).

²⁹ CJCS Memo requiring SOCOM and the Services for input on their individual plans to answer QDR Task 2.6.9 (U).

Deputy Commander, USSOCOM. The Commanding General USSOCOM had final approval. This chapter analyzes the two action plans.

B. USSOCOM'S PLAN TO EDUCATE IW STRATEGISTS (TASK 2.6.8)

On January 11, 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense received USSOCOM's signed response to the IW Execution Roadmap. USSOCOM's action plan, contained in the JS response to QDR task 2.6.8, provides USSOCOM's vision of a new training program of instruction. The responsive agent for USSOCOM on matters relating to IW education is the Special Operations Knowledge and Futures (SOKF) Center. ³⁰ USSOCOM's response to task 2.6.8 is a combination of new initiatives and previously existing educational opportunities for SOF. These opportunities are a combination of seminars offered at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and the Air Force Special Operations School, the Special Operations Master Degree Program (SOMDP) at NPS and computer based training available on the Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) and Defense Knowledge Online (DKO) web sites.

USSOCOM's response to Task 2.6.8 leverages individual web-based learning and additional IW related subjects in military advanced education and civilian advanced education curricula. External to USSOCOM the action plan leverages each Services' Intermediate Level Education (ILE) advanced studies programs. Each Services' advanced studies programs

³⁰ Boyd L. Ballard, E-mail message to author, November 25, 2008. Mr. Ballard works in USSOCOM SOKF-J7 Education Branch. SOKF has personnel within USSOCOM's J7, J9, J10 and JSOU ensuring integration, coordination and shared oversight of educational and training programs between USSOCOM, Services and Combatant Commands.

offer an opportunity to complete a master's degree and receive credit for Joint Professional Military Education I (JPME I). However, in terms of civilian advanced education curricula (master's degree programs pursued in conjunction with advanced studies programs) only SOMDP at NPS combines JPME I credit with an IW focused master degree.

USSOCOM fosters collaboration in IW education with the Services in two ways. Coordination and integration of programs to develop IW strategists and campaign planners into the Services' PME systems are currently underway. One example is USSOCOM, consisting of JSOU, the Special Operations Knowledge and Futures Center (SOKF), AFSOS and NPS integrate and share IW initiatives with the National Defense University (NDU).³¹ The second collaborative effort is USSOCOM's creation of an operational concept for education, which consists of three parts, "Education, Influence and Inform." Education initiatives consist of assisting and supporting the Services in the development of professional military education requirements for the future. Included within the education strategy is the coordination of limited IW resources, deconfliction of IW doctrine between conventional and SOF missions and providing a forum to discuss education proponent issues. USSOCOM in conjunction with U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has created the Joint Irregular Warfare Center (JIWC). The center provides a conduit between the Services and USSOCOM to initiate actions to ensure the proper resourcing of IW requirements against the challenges of implementing IW in DoD. USSOCOM addresses Influence initiatives through DoD IW

³¹ NDU is primarily responsible to conduct intermediate and senior level joint education.

JOC process and the IW Execution Roadmap. USSOCOM will Inform (share) all aspects of IW development, implementation and best practices with the IW community of interest (COI) through aggressive and transparent collaboration across the Services.³² USSOCOM utilizes its Special Operations Support Team (SOST) offices to ensure the Interagency Partnership Program (IPP) members remain aware of IW related issues requiring interagency (IA) support and coordination.

Task 2.6.9(U) requires a different focus. In answering the requirement to develop a cadre of SOF strategists and campaign planners USSOCOM built its own internal program, rather than rely on the Services PME programs.

C. USSOCOM'S THREE TIERED PROGRAM FOR TASK 2.6.9(U)

According to the scope of task 2.6.9(U),

The plan for developing a cadre of SOF strategists and campaign planners must account for current capabilities, defined operational requirements, established education curriculum, required training development, and future campaign planning and strategy development, and the growth of General Purpose Forces (GPF) capabilities to support IW.³³

³² Colonel Joseph Osborne, SOCOM J-10, *Irregular Warfare Brief*, Operational Concept definitions, slide 8, October 10, 2007.

³³ Department of Defense SOCOM, *Plan of Action QDR Task 2.6.9 (U)*, 2, paragraph 2-1, Scope. Received from Col Greenshields SOCOM Chair, NPS SOMDP.




Figure 2. SOF IW Strategist/Campaign Planner Education Concept³⁴

The USSOCOM plan to create SOF Strategist/Campaign Planners consists of three phases: Phase one, a Joint Special Operations Warfighter Certificate (JSOWC); Phase two, SOF Strategist and Campaign Planner PME-Supported Education; and Phase three, SOF Strategist and Campaign Planner Advanced Education. The USSOCOM methodology focuses on the individual through all three levels of training, with the ultimate goal of creating a fully qualified SOF strategist / campaign planner. In comparison, the Services training methodology consists of a building block approach to training, with the goal of preparing a unit for combat readiness.

JSOU's Phase one begins the process of IW education by establishing a foundation for subsequent phases.

³⁴ SOCOM's Response to *IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.9, 4*, Figure 6-1 (SOF Strategist/Campaign Planner Education Concept).

Phase 1 is the baseline level of education and training. The focus of this phase is to prepare core SOF and SOF enablers at the mid-level (O-3 and O-4, E-5 to E-8; W2-W4) and interagency personnel for the concept, capabilities and growth of IW prior to assignment in a joint billet. Phase 1 will be managed and developed by Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), consisting of current lessons/courses and provides a robust SOF/IW curricula. Since personnel background is varied, JSOU will review requests from personnel for constructive credit of this phase based on prior experience and completed courses. JSOU will organize lessons into a foundational course that awards a SOF/IW "certificate," a guarantee of competency in selected IW/SOF topics. To facilitate completion and participation of Phase 1, lessons will be modularized for flexible attendance policy, include a distance learning component (VTI + web) and stress a broad knowledge of SOF/IW with emphasis on synchronization and interoperability.³⁵

In February 2007, JSOU implemented the Joint Special Operations Warfighter Certificate (JSOWC) as the Baseline Education; the training consists of three modules: Strategic Thinking for Special Operations Forces Planners Course, Irregular Warfare Course and Joint Special Operations Collaborative Planning Course.³⁶ Each module is two weeks in length and offered twice a year at JSOU's Hurlburt Field, Florida Campus. Prior to arrival at Hurlburt Field, a prospective student must complete selected readings, a

³⁵ Department of Defense, *Plan of Action QDR Task 2.6.9* (U), 4, paragraph 6-2.

³⁶ John S. Prairie, "Joint special operations warfighter certificate," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Dec 2007. Info accessed via web (08 December 2008), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOKNN/is_/ai_n28028060.

lessons-learned familiarization with DoD Joint pubs, several web-based courses, and a pre-test.

Phase two combines ILE instruction conducted by the Services with USSOCOM-approved SOF specific blocks of instruction.

Phase 2 is the intermediate level of SOF strategist and planner education and training. Completion of JSOWC is required, and can be completed independently of Phase 2. Since Phase 2 *relies on implementation of QDR IW task 2.6.8 into the Services' PMEs*, development of IW learning objectives may require the placement of an MFP-11 funded SOF Chair at senior and intermediate level PME schools and coordination with the Joint Staff and Service PMEs. JSOU will assist (as required) in the development of core curriculum, academic exercises, wargame support and scenario development. Additionally, JSOU will develop exportable blocks of instruction for JPME using the curricula from Phase 1. These blocks of instruction will be available to all Service PMEs and interagencies; can be adjusted for desired cognitive level of learning and focus both on SOF and GPF roles in IW.³⁷

USSOCOM's vision for Phase three, Advanced Education is to send the best and brightest SOF and SOF enabler students to NPS' SOMDP. Using a curriculum that focuses on IW, USSOCOM will educate selected individuals as SOF Strategists / Campaign Planners.

[The goal] is to build upon the foundational lessons in Phase 1 and Phase 2 by providing a deeper understanding and more thorough investigation of specific IW topics and activity areas. Currently SOF and SOF enablers are able to complete Phase 3 through a Masters program, funded by USSOCOM at NPS. In order to support

³⁷ *SOCOM Plan of Action QDR Task 2.6.9* (U), 5, paragraph 6-3.

additional requirements, USSOCOM, in coordination with JSOU, will build partnerships with key advanced studies programs to provide substantial blocks of IW instruction (SAMS, JAWS, etc). Through these partnerships, USSOCOM will continue to inject SOF content in modified IW curricula, ensuring [IW related subject] currency.³⁸

Once an individual completes all three phases, USSOCOM recognizes them as subject matter experts at IW. USSOCOM is also developing a tracking mechanism with the Services' respective branch managers and detailers. This will enhance placement of fully qualified USSOCOM IW planners to critical billets. Clearly, USSOCOM recognizes the value of SAMS and the other advanced ILE courses by including them as qualifiers for SOF Strategist / Campaign Planner accreditation. Although SAMS currently includes 320 hours of "IW related instruction," ³⁹ its use as a case study in this thesis is based on their ability to produce conventional operational planners.

D. THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS MASTERS DEGREE PROGRAM AT NPS

In 1992, long before the QDR required the Services to focus on IW education, forward thinking Special Operations officers and NPS professors recognized the need to provide specialized instruction on IW related subjects. The current SOMDP curriculum has nine "tracks". Each track allows for further specialization and concentration.

The [SOMDP] curriculum provides a focused course of instruction in irregular warfare, sub-state

³⁸ *SOCOM Plan of Action QDR Task 2.6.9* (U), 5, paragraph 6-4.

³⁹ Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff action memo, *IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8 Plan*, Key Advanced Course and NPS Program Statistics, (U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 16 February 2008), 9.

conflict, terrorism and counterterrorism, and other "high leverage" operations in U.S. defense and foreign policy. The core program also provides every student with a strong background in strategic analysis, decision modeling, organization theory, and formal analytical methods. The student's program is built around a common set of core courses and a selected specialty track. Currently the [specialty] tracks offered are: Irregular Warfare, Information Operations, Terrorist Operations and Financing, Operations Analysis, Combat Systems, Financial Management, C4I Systems, National Security Affairs (Stability / Reconstruction), and National Security Affairs (Regional Studies). The individual student, depending on his or her interests and academic background, chooses the specialty track.⁴⁰

Currently, SOMDP requires 18 months of in-depth study culminating with an approved thesis. Those who complete the program receive a Master of Science Degree in Defense Analysis, with the selected specialty track emphasized in parentheses. The program is open to all services, interagency partners, and international officers.

NPS and USSOCOM are uniquely postured to provide a curriculum completely devoted to IW. The final Joint Staff response to the IW Execution Roadmap notes that the SOMDP is capable of

[the] development of strategists and campaign planners competent in IW. These courses produce graduates who can create campaign quality concepts, plan for the employment of all elements of national power, and succeed as operational/strategic planners. These creative,

⁴⁰ Navy Postgraduate School, General Catalog 2008, Department of Defense Analysis, <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/GeneralCatalog/Home.htm>, (accessed 05 July 2008).

conceptual, adaptive and innovative planners are valuable service combatant command and Joint Staff assets.⁴¹

Within their response, the Joint Staff recognized USSOCOM's portion of the IW Education Final Plan as equivalent to the Services' intermediate level programs. In their assessment, the JS stated, [SOMDP's] comparative advantage is that its' curriculum is built around teaching students "how to think," while focusing on IW related subjects. The completion of Phase two and three "qualifies personnel as Master Equivalent Level SOF Strategist/Planner."⁴²

Besides SOMDP the Phase Three plan also has additional support requirements to coordinate with JSOU to build partnerships with key advanced studies programs to provide substantial blocks of IW instruction. These partnerships will require the placement of SOF chairs at each of the Services' advanced education institutions, as well as memorandums of understanding / memorandums of agreement (MOU/MOA) between the commands. Through these partnerships and SOF chairs, USSOCOM will be able to inject SOF content in modified IW curricula, ensuring currency.⁴³

E. "CENTERS OF GRAVITY" FOR IW EDUCATION

The "center of gravity," as stated previously, for producing strategists and campaign planners is at Joint and Services advanced courses, advanced studies programs and programs like NPS's SOMDP. USSOCOM's response IW Execution

⁴¹ JS response, *Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8*, 10-11, paragraph 7.1.1.

⁴² JS response, *Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.9(U)*, 5, paragraph 6-4.

⁴³ Ibid, 5, paragraph 6-4.

Roadmap Task 2.6.9(U) built an original three-Phase education concept, with the third phase of USSOCOM IW education provided at SOMDP, SAMS, SAASS, SAW, JAWS and NOPC.⁴⁴ As of February 17, 2007, the current advanced studies schools (JAWS, SAMS, SAW, SAASS and NOPC) all have between twenty-five and fifty percent of their curricula as containing "IW related subjects."⁴⁵ SOMDP has almost three times more curriculum hours (924 to SAW's 394) and was at least five months longer than any other program (SOMDP 18 months, NOPC 13 months).⁴⁶ USSOCOM's SOF Strategist / Campaign Planner accreditation requires completion of Phases two and three. Within USSOCOM this qualifies the personnel as a master equivalent level SOF strategist/planner. At this time, institutionalizing and tracking this "accreditation" process by the Services has not been resolved. USSOCOM and NPS inform U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC), Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Branch Managers whom among their officer population have completed SOMDP. Branch Managers attempt to place SOMDP graduates into SOF operational planning billets.⁴⁷ However, this is not a requirement and Branch Managers often fill operational requirements with SOMDP graduates first, verse an assignment based on their IW planning capability.

⁴⁴ The advanced studies programs USSOCOM is sending SOF personnel to attend are detailed in the Services response to IW Roadmap task 2.6.8 in chapter two.

⁴⁵ *Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8*, chart titled "Key Advanced Course and NPS Program Statistics", 9.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 9.

⁴⁷ Numerous conversations and e-mails between author and USA Branch Managers for 18(SF), 37(PO) and 38(CA) between October 2007 and June 2008.

Where can USSOCOM look for help in developing their IW campaign strategist / planner program?

F. SEARCHING FOR A SUCCESSFUL MODEL FOR CAMPAIGN PLANNING

What should SOCOM's IW strategist education look like? USSOCOM's creation of a three-tiered education concept is not the only form of campaign planner education found within the DoD. Is it possible to improve the current process by creating a hybrid education process that utilizes the "best practices" of several systems?

For the purposes of this thesis, the author uses the SAMS program as a case study for analysis. SAMS is chosen because SAMS' graduates are highly valued by GCCs, and they have a proven record. Chapter IV examines three distinct parts (educational environment, teaching methodology and curriculum) of SAMS worthy for consideration as potential enhancements to USSOCOM's current concept.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

IV. CASE STUDY: SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

SAMS' AMSP exemplifies a flexible educational program. In the early eighties, senior Army officers recognized a "perceived gap between the levels of officer competence they observed and the level they would be comfortable going to to public attention during the first Gulf War, it is renowned for its advanced conventional operational planner education. SAMS' design focuses on the three major elements of education: the educational environment, teaching methodology, and the curriculum to maximize the professional output needed by the Army. These aspects of the SAMS program are important considerations in the development or revision of any IW planner education program.

A. HISTORY OF SAMS

Created in 1982, the SAMS' mission is "to educate officers at the graduate level in military art and science to produce leaders with the mental flexibility to solve complex problems in peace, conflict, and war." SAMS is actually a reincarnation of an Army program that existed during the early 20th century. Both the previous and current programs provide a second year of intermediate level professional military education for selected graduates of the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC).⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Huba Wass de Czege, *Final Report F-2-F-3*. Command and General Staff College is the formal name of the Ft. Leavenworth schoolhouse, which controls several curricula. Before the creation of Intermediate Level Education (ILE), Army Officers were required to complete CGSOC prior to competing for promotion to LTC. Reservist must complete CGSOC through at least Phase II for promotion consideration to LTC. ILE and the Advanced Operations Warfighting Course (AOWC) replaced the CGSOC curriculum.

Manpower needs, projected by the U.S. War Department prior to World War II, made it impossible to remove officers from the force for two years of training. This effectively ended the SAMS program in 1941. The graduate-level education program resumed after several post-Vietnam era studies identified shortcomings in the intermediate level officer education and training programs. These studies included the Officer Personnel Management System, Review of Education and Training of Officers (RETO report of 1978) and the Strategic Studies Institute's "Operational Planning: An Analysis of the Professional Military Education and Development of Effective Army Planners" (1982).⁴⁹ BG(R) Huba Wass de Czege spearheaded the creation of SAMS to address the shortcomings that these reports noted among the Army's mid-level officers. SAMS began as a pilot program in 1982 and was formally approved in 1984.⁵⁰

The current SAMS' program consists of two components: the Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF), and the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP). The focus of this case study is the AMSP course, commonly referred to as SAMS. This is a bit of a misnomer as AMSP and AOASF are two courses within the SAMS program. AMSP is designed for branch-qualified captains or higher with less than fourteen

⁴⁹ As the Army rebuilt itself following the Vietnam conflict, several studies (OPMS, RETO, SSI Report) identified shortcomings in the intermediate level officer education and training programs. These reports recommended reinstituting "Leavenworth's 2 year men" education program. The reports clearly identified the critical number of World War II generals who had attended Leavenworth's program and their impact on the force during World War II.

⁵⁰ John L. Gifford, *Teaching and Learning the Operational Art of War: An Appraisal of the School of Advanced Military Studies* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2000), 6.

years active federal commissioned service. The AOASF program is an Army War College equivalent course, admitting lieutenant colonels and colonels. AOASF is part of AMSP's faculty development. Both have elements applicable to the design of an IW educational program.

B. EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The first element stressed by SAMS is the educational environment. Creating an effective learning environment is an essential part of any educational program or institution. An educational environment consists of the faculty and the students.

1. Student Selection

The caliber of the student population has a direct effect on the outcome of training devoted to individual and group development. Thus, the creators of the current SAMS' program established a selection process for enrollment. Perspective applicants must volunteer for the program. The volunteer completes the JPME I program (service specific example being the CGSOC's Intermediate Level Education / Advanced Officer Warfighter Course (ILE / AOWC)). Volunteers must receive a recommendation from their chain of command, take the Nelson-Denney reading comprehension test, and complete a written examination that measures military knowledge, tactical reasoning, and written communication skills. The SAMS candidate must also write several short essays that answer questions from the admissions board, and pass an oral interview with the Director of SAMS. A board consisting of JPME department directors then votes on each applicant's file. The board creates an order of merit list,

and each fiscal year, approximately ninety students matriculate. Even with the increased stress of ongoing operational requirements, enrollment has not dropped below seventy-eight since 2001.⁵¹

2. Faculty

Each SAMS Small Group Seminar (SGS) classroom consists of no more than fifteen students and three instructors. The SAMS' faculty consists of one civilian Ph.D. professor, one primary small group instructor (Lieutenant Colonel), one assistant instructor (Colonel), who is an operational subject matter expert (SME) in their second year of the U.S. Army War College's Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship (AOASF) program.

The AOASF program annually enrolls up to eight U.S. Army and Marine Corps colonels and lieutenant colonels for focused study on the skills and knowledge required for strategic and operational campaign planning in and between theaters of war across the entire spectrum of conflict. Subsequent assignment upon completion of their fellowship will be as theater level planners. The AOASF Fellows in their first year engage in study consisting of classroom investigation of multinational, joint and interagency environment, extensive travel to DoD regional commands and headquarters around the world. Second year fellows serve as instructors in the AMSP seminars alongside PhDs from the

⁵¹ *U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Self-Study Report*, submitted to the Higher Learning Commission of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, December 2005, 75.

resident SAMS faculty.⁵² Using this combination of theory and experience, the SAMS' program ensures outstanding training of its next class of conventional operational planners.

C. TEACHING METHODOLOGY

The second element is the teaching methodology. SAMS uses outcome-based education (OBE), which is a student-centered learning philosophy that focuses on empirically measuring student performance. It requires that students demonstrate that they have learned the required skills and content. In practice, OBE generally promotes curricula and assessment based on constructivist methods (gaining knowledge and meaning from experiences) and discourages traditional education approaches based on direct instruction of facts and standard methods.⁵³ SAMS utilizes small-group interaction in lieu of didactic instruction (teaching from textbooks rather than demonstration and hand-on application) for many of its courses. There are only eleven to thirteen students in each small group seminar. The seminar leader facilitates dialogue between the students to induce student discovery. Professors avoid using lectures as a teaching method in the seminar rooms. Very few lesson plans require the use of auditoriums for group lectures or guest speakers during the school calendar. Besides small group discussion and lecture, exercise programs reinforce the classroom discussion. The exercises and simulations utilize the "reflective practitioner" model to complement classroom

⁵² *U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Self-Study Report*, submitted to the Higher Learning Commission of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, December 2005, 30.

⁵³ Outcome Based Education, assessed via web 20 January 2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outcome-based_education.

learning. These exercise programs allow students the opportunity to place theory into practice using simulations and role-playing exercises. Donald Schon developed the theory of "reflective practitioner" to explain how professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and architects transfer learned theory into practice. In his book *The Reflective Practitioner*, Schon discusses ways in which education can prepare practitioners to solve clean, rational, scientific-technical type problems using practice-based theory.⁵⁴ The faculty at SAMS utilizes the techniques documented in Schon's study. SAMS students improve their craft through individual discovery learning (reflective learning), which is then coupled with practical exercises (practitioner learning). The result is a student who can take theory and apply it in practical application.

D. CURRICULUM

Lastly, the curriculum is the final product of the SAMS system. SAMS is part of the Army Service's Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) accreditation system. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, Congress directed the Services to implement mandatory JPME education, training and joint billet assignments in order to facilitate better inter-service operability. However, the Act did not stipulate precise cross-service training requirements, instead allowing the services and Combatant Commanders to establish their own training requirements. The SAMS' organizes its POI the following way.

⁵⁴ Donald A. Schon, *The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action*, Basic Books, New York, 1983.

The curriculum consists of three trimesters, each with a distinct focus. The first trimester emphasizes the study of military theory, history, and doctrine. The second concentrates on "leading change" and explores new concepts of modular organization and execution within the Army. During the third trimester, students are allowed to select an area for focused study, reinforced by participation in practical staff exercises.⁵⁵

SAMS utilizes the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) approved lesson plan format in both the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) and the Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF). This format provides standardized instruction for military personnel throughout the Army, and requires that all Army service instructors (including those at the Special Warfare Center) must graduate from the TRADOC-approved Instructor Training Course (ITC).

By focusing on not only the curriculum, but also the faculty and teaching method, SAMS has created an effective program of instruction for operational conventional planners. The program not only offers premium education, but the flexibility to adapt itself to the requirements of twenty-first century forms of warfare. Comparing and contrasting SOCOM's proposed program for IW education with the SAMS' conventional planner system allows one to evaluate each simultaneously, thereby producing the most effective IW planners.

⁵⁵ *U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Self-Study Report*, 30.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF USSOCOM'S IW EDUCATION PROPOSAL TO SAMS CONVENTIONAL PLANNER EDUCATION

The basis for SAMS' evaluation is solely on how well it teaches conventional campaign planning. Although the USSOCOM approach is a three-tiered process, the actual comparison within this thesis is only between SAMS and SOMDP. This chapter contains three sub-sections. Each sub-section lists the comparative subject and then addresses strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Each sub-section concludes with a determination of which system is better and why. Finally, the author will attempt to develop a hybrid of the two approaches, maximizing each comparative advantage.

A. COMPARISON OF EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1. Student Selection

The JSOU 3 tier IW Education process does not use student selection for the first and second phase of education. For officers wishing to attend the SOMDP (Phase Three), there is a selection process. Every January a selection board composed of the Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Group at HRC, ⁵⁶ the Director of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (USAJFCSWC) and the Directorate of Army Special Operations Proponency, convenes to review the files of potential candidates. Officers who desire to attend NPS must submit

⁵⁶ HRC ARSOF Group composed of branch managers for SF, PSYOP, CA, and includes files for officers serving in Ranger units, special operations aviation and special mission units.

documentation, including Graduate Record Exam (GRE) results, to their respective branch managers⁵⁷.

Perspective SAMS students must apply through the President's Board of CGSC for recommendation to attend the program. Included with their application are the results of several general knowledge tests, a pre-exam to determine the level of proficiency they acquired during ILE and AOWC, a writing proficiency essay and a personality exam. However, there is no graduate entrance exam requirement for SAMS.

All professional graduate level institutions use the GRE to test applicants' scholastic aptitude. This test is the benchmark nation-wide for graduate student's entrance into any civilian institution of higher learning. Arguably, the SAMS student selection criteria may distill the best military officer among applicants, but it does little to determine the best academician. Both CGSC and NPS are looking for the Services best officers to attend their respective programs. The goal of each institutions approach to determining student selection is to bring the most competitive student from the Services into their respective programs. The fact that NPS uses *GRE* to measure potential student aptitude, and SAMS created its own approach, demonstrates little difference in the quality level of the students attending either SAMS or SOMDP. Both approaches bring top quality applicants into their programs, making them even for the sub-section of student quality.

⁵⁷ There is no selection criteria for students to attend Phase one or Phase two. Any service member can apply to USSOCOM's Phase One Special Operations Warfighter Certification modules taught at JSOU. The majority of officers of the rank O-4 attend one of the Services ILE PME schools. Phase two relies on implementation of QDR task 2.6.8 (SOF chairs facilitating additional IW blocks of instruction) into Services ILE programs.

Although not a strong enough criterion to be a discriminator, due to the fact SAMS is Service-centric, the Army has the ability to track student graduates through the designation of an additional skill identifier (ASI). This warrants discussion, as there are joint professional military education (PME) schools, such as courses at the Joint Forces Staff College, or any of the Services War Colleges, accredited and tracked by the other Services.

As of yet, USSOCOM has no official method of tracking, through skill identifiers or other means, students who have completed JSOU electives or SOMDP with the Services.⁵⁸ This is due to the fact USSOCOM has very few Service approved "accredited" courses it can assign a recognized tracking code. One example of USSOCOM accreditation is the ability to teach ILE at NPS's SOMDP. USSOCOM has "service-like" authorities, but lacks sole proponency for IW across DoD to grant a skill identifier for an individual whom SOCOM trains/educates as a SOF IW Campaign Strategist / Planner. If the Joint Staff accredits USSOCOM's SOF IW Campaign Strategist / Planner approach, then the Services could agree upon a uniform additional skill identifier or designate their own.⁵⁹ As an example, the National Defense University may grant JPME II accreditation to any student who completes the course requirements at the Joint Forces Staff College's Joint and Combined Staff Officer School.

⁵⁸ Jim Sykes, and Ken Cobb, E-mail and phone conversations with author, 8-9 December 2008, Colonel Sykes is the current SOF chair at JSOU, Mr. Kenny Cobb is a government contractor working as an instructor at JSOU.

⁵⁹ E-mail and phone conversations between author and Ken Cobb, 8-9 December 2008.

SAMS is a Service run school and the Army has proponency over the education and training through Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This allows Ft. Leavenworth's CGSG to assign the skill identified (59) to graduates of SAMS AMSP. Recognized throughout the Army, the skill identifier 59 is tracked by U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) in each Soldier's official military record. Sister Services have recognized the quality training the Army is offering and have agreements with the Army to recognize the completion of AMSP as the equivalent of a Service operational planner.

All Services, assign their SAMS graduates to operational campaign planner slots on Joint Commands and Service Headquarters Staffs. The Army Service grants a skill identifier of (59) for Army personnel. Yet, USSOCOM does not have authority to designate an ASI for completion of the three tiered SOF IW Strategist / Planner education. SAMS clearly is ahead of USSOCOM in its method of tracking students. USSOCOM has additional structural barriers outlined above to overcome.

2. Faculty

Nineteen of the twenty-one professors (ninety percent) at NPS's Defense Analysis Department, responsible for the SOMDP, have PhD's.⁶⁰ The faculty includes anthropologists, theologians, political scientists, historians, mathematicians, and social scientists. As eclectic as the faculty is, the common denominator is a focus on terrorism

⁶⁰ NPS Department of Defense Analysis Senior Lecturer and Associate Chair for Operations Pete Gustaitis, interview by author, Monterey, CA., 26 November 2007.

and unconventional warfare. Their degrees are from very prestigious academic institutions such as Stanford, Johns Hopkins, Columbia University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard, Berkley and University of Chicago.

Over seventy-five percent of the resident teaching faculty at SAMS/AMSP holds PhDs. All of the active duty officer instructors have master's degrees; the majority of these degrees earned as students while attending SAMS/AMSP.⁶¹ This reinforces their expertise at conventional planning but limits their potential exposure to other academic forms of learning. Students and instructors become "masters" of Fort Leavenworth's CGSC education system. Militarily that can be reinforcing; yet it is the author's opinion that academically, it is quite limited at teaching students "how to think."

Diversity of subject matter expertise and higher percentage of PhD's among the faculty makes the SOMDP faculty ideal for irregular warfare education.

B. COMPARISON OF TEACHING METHODS

1. USSOCOM

SOMDP professors use seminar style, learner-centric interactive classroom instruction. Several of the classes that teach students "how to think" use the Socratic

⁶¹ Completion of SAMS AMSP program result in a Master of Military Arts and Science granted by Ft. Leavenworth's CGSC under approval of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, Accessed via web 13 December 2008, <http://www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/contentdm/sams.htm>.

Method.⁶² NPS enforces attendance strictly, as presence in the classroom is equivalent to "present for duty." All instruction is face to face between students and professors. This is an important distinction to make in the era of web-based, multi media distance learning and video tele-instruction. It is the author's opinion that these are just high technology band-aids for the student and teacher being together in a classroom or laboratory. Part of SOMDP teaching method is to improve students' professional writing capability by having them write articles for publication in periodicals. Although the only graduation requirement for publication is the students' thesis, several professors at NPS grade written work based on its potential for publication. SOMDP averages between twenty-five to forty students in a few core courses. The electives average between as little as ten and no more than twenty-five students. USSOCOM has authorized the DA Department to hire at least two additional instructors to offset increased student population.

2. SAMS

SAMS employs several teaching methods all re-enforcing adaptive learning methodology through verbal, written and "reflective practitioner" (hand-on) interaction. Since 1982, CGSC's cadre of professional educators and contractors have been improving their system of education. Although

⁶² The design of these classes is to draw the student into question / discussion and follow on question. By breaking down hypothesis, reframing questions and then breaking these new hypothesis down again students grasp the importance of asking "why" and expand their view of how to problem solve. Classes included The Military Advisor, Critical Thinking and Ethical Decision making, Building Consensus and Anthropology of Conflict.

SAMS claims to teach a student "how to think," it is the author's opinion that their curriculum lends itself more to assimilating knowledge and learning process. This working knowledge base combined with understanding Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) processes allows the student to demonstrate what they have learned in conventional operational planning simulation exercises. This teaching methodology is so remarkably efficient at creating operational planners that it has been exported, almost in its' entirety, by the JAWS and SAW schoolhouses.

3. Commonalities

Both SAMS and USSOCOM's SOMDP have highly educated faculty members who are able to facilitate an advanced level of adult-style instruction. Both programs maximize time spent in seminar environments and small group, interactive, professor-mediated learning. This approach has proven to be more effective than traditional cognitive learning systems such as lectures.⁶³ In fact, SAMS has removed nearly all its strictly didactic teaching. The one exception is Very Important Person (VIP) briefs, which are the same as the Secretary of the Navy Guest Lectures (SGL) briefing program conducted at NPS.

⁶³ Carl Ransom Rogers, *Freedom to Learn: A View of What Education Might Become*, C.E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969, http://adulted.about.com/cs/adultlearningthe/a/carl_rogers.htm, accessed 16 December 2007. Additional sources on adult learning include Malcolm Knowles, *The Modern Practice of Adult Education: From Pedagogy to Andragogy*, and Peter Rener's *The Art of Teaching Adults*.

Both schools try to facilitate discussion in a combination of lecture and student engagement. However, the POI required by SAMS ensures the discussion stays on track to meet specific learning objectives. The smaller SAMS classroom may facilitate more discussion between each student and the instructor; however, this becomes negated by the requirement to accomplish all learning objectives listed within the class syllabi for a given period. SOMDP professors are not tied to their syllabi. This allows the professor the freedom to explore class subjects more thoroughly; extrapolating experiences and insights from the diverse student population to reinforce the subjects listed in the syllabi.

Although the classroom subjects are different for each approach, the teaching methods employed by SAMS AMSP and USSOCOM's SOMDP are the same. I rank their teaching methodologies as equal.

C. COMPARISON OF CURRICULUM

SOMDP is an eighteen-month, minimum twenty-one courses, thesis, plus mandatory symposia, roundtable forums and a robust series of guest speakers.⁶⁴

SOMDP curriculum has several positive attributes. These include the greater level of overall curriculum hours required to receive a master's degree and more devotion to development of thought process, reasoning, and adaptability to change. However, this instruction requires an additional six months of time. NPS awards graduates of SOMDP a

⁶⁴ Brian Greenshields & Peter Gustaitis, *Naval Postgraduate School: Training special operations personnel for certainty; educating for uncertainty*, *Special Warfare Magazine*, (Sept-Oct 2008), 26.

Master's of Science in Defense Analysis upon completion of the program. An additional improvement to SOMDP is that now all ARSOF students can receive ILE credit (JPME I).

In July [2008], the Army deputy chief of staff G3 /5/ 7 granted full ILE / JPME I / MEL 4 credit for Army SF, CA and PSYOP officers attending SOMDP, providing that they complete four PME courses offered at the Naval War College's Monterey satellite campus, conveniently located at NPS, and that they attend the two-week ILE Prep Course prior to reporting to NPS.⁶⁵

The development of the thought processes and reasoning necessary for IW planning is as important a goal as covering the course content. Courses on Critical Thinking and Ethical Decision Making, Guerilla Warfare, Anatomy of Intelligence, Psychological Operations and Deception, War in the Information Age, and the Military Advisor, to name a few, impress upon the IW student the need to "open the aperture". This allows the professors to create, or expand upon the lens or framework each student possesses for analytical reasoning. The NPS program uses such subjects as terrorist financing, dark networks, social network analysis, culture and influence, wicked problems and the rise of religious violence to teach various tenets of IW based on those subjects. Students recognize that the analytical tools they are developing are of functional utility and application against almost any problem set, not just IW operational problems.

Changes in warfare are inevitable, and the curriculum must adapt to these changes in order to meet the needs of

⁶⁵ Brian Greenshields & Peter Gustaitis, *Naval Postgraduate School: Training special operations personnel for certainty; educating for uncertainty*, Special Warfare Magazine, (September-October 2008), 27.

the military. NPS hires only professors with recognized academic scholarship and subject matter expertise in the field of study they are teaching, and gives those instructors the latitude to organize, update, and teach their own subjects. At the micro level, student feedback, in the form of end-of-course reviews and daily interaction with the department chair, can initiate syllabus changes. At the macro level, the SOMDP has two approval processes that can revise or create additional courses. The first is the biennial USSOCOM validation process. The second is NPS's accreditation by the Accrediting Commission for Senior Colleges and Universities of the Western Association of Schools and Colleges (WASC).⁶⁶ This accreditation occurs every ten years.⁶⁷ As of September 2009 NPS is currently undergoing WASC accreditation. There are no major deficiencies or required changes to SOMDP noted. JSOU officially conducts SOCOM's bi-annual review. Besides JSOU the SOCOM J9 Special Operations Knowledge and Futures Center (SOKF) provides educational experts to all SOCOM's learning centers to review POIs and ensure continuity of quality training and education. JSOU's most recent review of the

⁶⁶ The Accrediting Commission for Senior Colleges and Universities of the Western Association of Schools and Colleges (WASC) accredits NPS. Within the school, the Aeronautical, Electrical, and Mechanical Engineering curricula are further accredited by the Accrediting Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET), and the Systems Management curricula are accredited by the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA) and the American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB). <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/QLinks/Accreditation.html>, (accessed 27 November 2007).

⁶⁷ NPS' first accreditation by WASC was 1955, their last accreditation was 1999, NPS' next accreditation is scheduled for 2009. Info accessed via web 16 December 2007, http://www.wascsenior.org/wasc/Doc_Lib/2006_2007SeniorDirectory.pdf.

SOMDP is scheduled for October of 2009.⁶⁸ To ensure no duplication of lesson plan revisions and courses within its various schools, an NPS review board made up of members of the faculty reviews course requirements and makes recommendations to the school and department heads as necessary. This makes the program highly flexible, with POI updates occurring as rapidly as necessary to keep up with the evolving IW environment.

It is the author's opinion that there are two curricula positives and two negatives from the SAMS POI. The positives include SAMS use of computer simulations for practical exercises and the strength of courses to create conventional campaign planners. The negative elements of the SAMS approach include limited interactive learning and the Army bureaucracy, which makes affecting changes to the POI cumbersome and slow.

SAMS greatest advantage is their use of practical exercises and computer simulation to take classroom instruction and provide empirical feedback to the students. The curriculum of AMSP consists of five courses (Strategic Decision Making, Art of Design, Applied National Power, Evolution of Operational Art, 21st Century Conflict), three design practices, a GCC computer simulation exercise covering the joint operations planning process (JOPP), a Joint Task Force (JTF) or Division computer simulation Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) exercise and a forty to fifty page monograph with oral defense.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Brian Greenshields, NPS SOF-chair, E-mail message to author, September 3, 2009.

⁶⁹ Andrew M. Johnson, SOF chair SAMS, e-mail and phone conversation with author, December 10, 2008.

Limited interactive learning occurs within the SAMS program due to strict adherence to Terminal Learning Objectives (TLOs) and Enabling Learning Objectives (ELOs) within the allotted block of instruction (generally 90 to 120 minutes, based on core or elective class). SAMS instructors must carefully guide additional classroom discussion or tangential subjects in order to reach the expected TLOs for the lesson plan. SAMS instructors do have considerable latitude in determining whether each student has demonstrated the requirements spelled out in the "Assessment Plan" for each lesson plan. Although subjective, in several interviews conducted by the author, neither students nor instructors perceived that time constraints resulted in a minimization of student-sponsored participation in classroom discussion.⁷⁰

All CGSC (including SAMS, and CGSOC) electives and operational planning exercises must go through a curriculum review process to change curricula. A designated CGSC forum reviews each core course annually. The forum consists of student representatives, department heads and primary instructors who work with the Dean of Academics during these annual reviews. Faculty members have the latitude to teach the learning objectives as they choose, but they cannot alter those objectives; this may occur only during the curriculum review process. The elective courses in the SAMS program, such as the SOF chair sponsored IW electives, do not receive the same rigorous review as the core courses. Therefore, faculty members have full latitude to make

⁷⁰ Timothy Heinemann, & Andrew, Johnson, E-mail messages to author, October through November 2007. Col (R) Heinemann was the CGSOC Dean of Academics from 2000-2003, and LTC Johnson is the current senior officer School of Advanced Military Studies, CGSC Special Operations Education Element.

changes and updates to their syllabi internally. 71

Accreditation of SAMS occurs through the Command and General Staff College within the U.S. Army's Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth. TRADOC accredits all versions of Command and General Staff Officers Course/Intermediate Learning Education (CGSOC/ILE) for intermediate PME and leader development. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff accredits all versions of CGSOC/ILE JPME Phase 1. The North Central Association (NCA) of the Higher Learning Commission is the regional agency charged with accrediting those institutions that grant undergraduate and graduate degrees; these institutions include CGSOC/ILE and SAMS, which offer the Master of Military Arts and Science (MMAS). Fort Leavenworth's Command General Staff College accreditation by NCA occurred in 2005. ⁷² There is no formal accreditation requirement between CGSC and NCA; however, TRADOC, the U.S. Army Quality Assurance Office and the CGSOC Staff and Faculty Council do have annual requirements to inspect and make recommendations back to the school.

The curriculum at SAMS is as successful at teaching conventional operational planning as the SOMDP curriculum is at teaching critical thinking and training capable

⁷¹ Command and General Staff College Dean of Academics 2000-2003
Colonel (R) Timothy Heinemann, e-mail correspondence with author. 27
November 2007.

⁷² Accreditation data on all CGSC schools was accessed December 2, 2007 via CGSC's web site, http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/QAO/dao_faqs.asp. As part of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, CGSC falls under the authority of TRADOC at Fort Monroe Va. As mandated by TRADOC, the Quality Assurance Office (QAO) publishes the master evaluation plan on an annual basis to project evaluation and assessment requirements. In addition to the Higher Learning Commission of the North Central Association, CGSC is subject to periodic professional accreditation review by two bodies within DoD. Teams from TRADOC and Process for Accreditation of Joint Education Office (PAJE) both visited CGSC and filed reports extending accreditation of joint and professional military education programs.

operators, using the study of IW as a focus. Both schools have systems for accreditation in place. The programs are similar in their classroom teaching methods, but USSOCOM SOMDP has a much more diversified curriculum for teaching students how to think about IW. USSOCOM's SOMDP at NPS is much more flexible for curriculum changes, with less bureaucracy for approval.

The primary areas that USSOCOM's approach is better than SAMS are in curriculum diversity and flexibility to change to meet real world educational demands. This is not a significant edge in my view, and I rate curriculum as even between both approaches.

VI. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The 2006 QDR identified a need to improve IW competency in the DoD. It established specific and measurable goals for both USSOCOM and the Services. One aspect was to develop systems to train IW Specialists. Organizational behavior, both good and bad, influences the response by USSOCOM and SAMS. USSOCOM recommended additional SOF-Chairs, exportable IW blocks of instruction and the Naval Postgraduate School's SOMDP to address IW Execution Roadmap task 2.6.8. USSOCOM then developed a three-phase approach in response to IW Execution Roadmap task 2.6.9(U) to leverage JSOU, ILE, advanced ILE and SOMDP to create the SOF IW Campaign Strategist / Planner.

In the findings portion of this chapter the author lists the "best practices" discovered from both approaches (conventional and IW campaign planner education). In the conclusions portion of this chapter the author expands three areas for improvement in the USSOCOM response to QDR task 2.6.9(U). These areas include curriculum, computer simulations/exercises and education oversight (proponency). In the recommendations portion of the chapter, the author builds a revised SOF IW Strategist / Planner education model that incorporates the "best practices" gleamed from analyzing both the SAM program and USSOCOM's proposed approach to IW campaign planner education.

A. FINDINGS

From the USSOCOM approach, my analysis determined the faculty is its best practice. The teaching method, curriculum and student selection process are of equal

caliber to the SAMS program of campaign planner education. The SAMS program is better than USSOCOM's approach at student tracking, program oversight (proponency) and incorporating computer simulations and staff practical exercises.

B. CONCLUSIONS: THREE AREAS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF USSOCOM'S APPROACH

1. Curriculum

The author recommends three additional courses to "round-out" the curriculum of the SOMDP. These courses are Crisis Action Planning (CAP), Interagency Planning and Coordination, and Stability Operations (which covers the mission requirements for Building Partner Capacity (BPC) and Security Force Assistance (SFA)). The requirement for the addition of these three courses within the SOMDP POI is due to the fact they represent the three areas SAMS students receive current IW related education, not conducted within the SOMDP.⁷³ SOMDP does not educate students on the "whole of government" approach used by the rest of the U.S. Government when discussing the forms of foreign power engagement strategies, or the Interagency Management System (IMS) available to the U.S. government. SAMS recognizes that a conventional operational planner who only comprehends the DIME principles and incorporates four of the expanded

⁷³ Stability Operations instruction is available at NPS through the Civil-Military Relations - Curriculum 685, , and Stabilization & Reconstruction - Curriculum 686, NS 4236 Stability Operations, accessed via internet, 14 December 2008, <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/GeneralCatalog/Home.htm>.

seven aspects ⁷⁴ of foreign policy available to the U.S. Government is doomed to prepare an inadequate campaign plan, uncoordinated with the rest of the Interagency (IA). The last class, Crisis Action Planning (CAP) is a shortened version of the seventeen-step MDMP process. It would introduce the student to JOPES and TPFDD data manipulation. The CAP process, taught at SAMS and part of JPME II curriculum could be taught at SOMDP by the Navy War College (NWC) staff currently assigned at NPS to teach JPME I. An alternate course of action could be for instructors from U.S. Naval War College (NWC) teach the CAP process in temporary assigned duty (TAD) status at NPS.

2. Computer Simulations and Exercises

SAMS, the other Services' advanced studies programs, and the War Colleges use capstone exercises and computer-simulated staff exercises in addition to classroom curriculum. These exercises augment lessons learned in the classroom with practical application through simulation. This is labor, time, and instructor intensive. However, it provides the students real feedback on what they retained and are able to apply in a real-world situation.

To round out the student experience at NPS, the SOMDP should create IW related capstone events in each of the SOMDP sub-curricula. At a minimum, students should conduct

⁷⁴ DIME stands for diplomatic, informational, military and economic. There are several newer acronyms for analyzing a system: MIDLIFERS, PMESII etc. Although there is no doctrinal "right answer," most GCC, TSOC and Corps staffs the author has witnessed use the seven engagement strategies known as DIMEFILE: diplomacy, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement.

an IW capstone event in the Joint Information Operations track, the Irregular Warfare track, and the Counter-Terrorism track.

3. Educational Oversight

The Joint Staff adjudicated IW education proponentcy with DoD Directive 3000.7. USSOCOM is the proponent for development for SOF doctrine relevant to IW, and will "contribute to the integration of SOF-GPF IW relevant doctrine with CDRUSJFCOM, CJCS and Secretaries of the Military Departments."⁷⁵ The USSOCOM J-9 staff section within SOKF that reviews education, in conjunction with JSOU, and SOCOM J-10 (IW Directorate) should become the facilitator and advocate of all USSOCOM IW education.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

The author proposes the creation of a new USSOCOM SOF IW Strategist / Campaign Planner model. It is the author's opinion that the three-phase approach is unnecessary. JSOU's modules (Phase one) are of great value for anyone going to a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), or any location within the USSOCOM staff. Any officer who completes ILE and SAMS or SOMDP (Phases Two and Three) is an IW Strategist / Planner according to the JS action memo; therefore, the Phase one training is not necessary. Advanced ILEs and SOMDP are the "centers of gravity" for IW education according to the Joint Staff. The focus of USSOCOM's IW training should revolve around creating the best course of instruction leveraging these already

⁷⁵ DoD Directive 3000.07, December 1, 2008, subparagraph 11a-d, 9-10.

recognized "centers of gravity." Currently the SOF chairs at each advanced ILE are working with JSOU and the Joint Staff to incorporate more blocks of IW instruction into their POIs.

The author recommends teaching the entire new "expanded SOMDP" at NPS' Monterey campus. The "expanded SOMDP" would add additional instruction and incorporate computer simulations and staff exercises, with a capstone event. This additional education would add six months of time to the current eighteen month POI. The Services could absorb this additional time, if all students attending SOMDP attended NWC ILE instruction and received credit for JPME I while attending the "expanded SOMDP." USSOCOM, as the proponent for SOF IW Strategist / Campaign Planner education, must gain accreditation for the SOMDP from the Joint Staff. This would ensure SOF IW Strategists / Planners could be tracked and placed in staff positions to execute full-spectrum IW operations in joint, multinational and interagency environments.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VII. THE WAY-AHEAD

This thesis conducted an analysis of two systems, SAMS AMSP and USSOCOM's SOMDP. It combined the best practices of both into a recommended hybrid system for USSOCOM to adopt.

Considerations that require additional research may include, but are not limited to the following:

1. Conduct a cost estimate for NPS to expand SOMDP to include military computer simulations, JOPP, Operational MDMP Crisis Action Planning (CAP) seminars and the additional six-month time requirement.

2. Conduct a DoD wide manpower survey to determine the number and placement of IW Strategist and Campaign Planners required to support the general-purpose forces (GPF) and SOF units.

3. Develop a system to allow the Services to identify and track IW campaign planners for assignment to best utilize their skills.

4. Is it possible to create a system of human resource management to track the IW specialists beyond their DoD careers? This would allow utilization of their special skill set in the civilian and interagency environment.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ For more on IW planners/leaders post career marketability, see The McCormick Tribune Foundation's essay on *Irregular Warfare Leadership in the 21st Century*, 2-3 May 2007. www.McCormickTribune.org.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Allison, Graham and Philip Zeliko., *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. 2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1999.
- Cable, Larry, E. *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War*. New York: New York University Press, 1986.
- Creswell, John, W. *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2003.
- Daalder, Ivo H. and Michael E. O'Hanlon. *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings institution Press, 2000.
- Donnelly, Tom. "Kill the QDR." *Armed Forces Journal*: February 18, 2006.
- Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*. 2nd ed. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 2005.
- Gifford, John, L. "Teaching and Learning the Operational Art of War: An Appraisal of the School of Advanced Military Studies." Masters thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2000.
- Heinemann, Timothy. E-mail message to author, November 25, 2007.
- Higher Learning Commission of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools. "U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Self-Study Report," December 2005.
- Johnson, Chalmers. *Revolutionary Change*. 2nd ed. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1982.
- Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

- Marquis, Susan, L. *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997.
- Nagl, John A. *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
- Osowski, Christine. "Approaching the QDR as a Process." *The Avascent Review*. Issue No 10, March 2006.
- Packer, George. "Knowing the Enemy." *The New Yorker*, 24 October 2006.
- Paret, Peter, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Rogers, Carl, R., *Freedom to Learn: A View of What Education Might Become*, C.E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969.
- Rothstein, Hy S. *Afghanistan & the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006.
- Sherman, Jason. "New Blueprint for Irregular Warfare." *Military.com*, 16 May 2006.
- Snook, Scott A. *Friendly Fire: The Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Black Hawks over Northern Iraq*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Tenne, Timothy T. "Why the Military Can't Do It All: Where are the Other Instruments of Power?" *Armed Forces Journal*, April 2007.
- U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff. *Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8*. Action memo, provided to author by SOF Chair NPS Department of Defense Analysis, Col Brian Greenshields, February 16, 2007.
- U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff. *Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8.*, provided to author by Professor Pete Gustaitis, NPS Department of Defense Analysis, October 2007.

- U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff. *Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.9 (U)*, Professor Pete Gustaitis, NPS Department of Defense Analysis, October 2007.
- U.S. Department of Defense, Special Operations Command J-10 Staff, *SOCOM plan of action IW Roadmap Task 2.6.9 (U)*.
- U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. *IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8 Plan*. Action Memo. February 16, 2007.
- U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Plan for Development of a Cadre of Special Operations Forces Strategists and Campaign Planners*. Memorandum SJS 07-00214. January 11, 2007.
- U.S. Department of Defense. *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Final version 1.0*. September 11, 2007.
- Van Creveld, Martin. *The Transformation of War*. New York: The Free Press, 1990.
- Vickers, Michael. *Implementing GWOT Strategy: Overcoming Interagency Problems*. Testimony before the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 15, 2006. <http://csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/T.20060315.ImplementingGWOT/T.20060315ImplementingGWOT.pdf>.
- Wass de Czege, Huba. "Final Report: Army Staff College Level Training Study." Report presented at U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1983.
- Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.
- Wilson, James Q. *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1989.
- Yeliv, Steven A. *Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision-Making & the Persian Gulf War*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
3. United States Special Operations Command
Tampa Bay, Florida